Lies, manipulation, conspiracy and defamation: the choice of the tuna lobby

06 June 2024

The day after the publication of our latest report comparing the environmental, social and economic asssessments of two tuna fishing models in the Indian Ocean, the French tuna fishers’ union, Orthongel, issued a press release entitled “Trop, c’est trop ! Comment BLOOM manipule l’information pour influer sur le débat public !” (Enough is enough! How BLOOM manipulates information to influence public debate!).[1]

Far from providing factual information, Orthongel has opted for two overlapping approaches, both equally illegitimate:

1. By resorting to lies, manipulation, conspiracy and defamation — like so many other industrial lobbies before them — only able to attack us on the basis of alleged conflicts of interest rather than questioning their destructive and exhausted model. Orthongel claims that “all tricks are fair game [including] the corruption of certain members of the [Indian Ocean Tuna Commission]“, citing an “article” in the newspaper Le Point, known for its far-right and conspiracy positions.[2] Orthongel, on the other hand, knows all about conflicts of interest: given that a Maritime Affairs administrator in charge of tuna fishing was seconded to them by the French administration in 2022. This individual was then made available to the Europêche industrial fishing lobby as director of the ‘tuna group’ to scuttle a European regulation, France’s violation of which earned it a formal notice from the European Commission. In November 2022, we referred the matter to The Parquet national financier (or PNF, a French institution tasked with investigation and prosecution in instances of financial crime), which opened an investigation the following month into illegal conflict of interest (proceedings are still underway).

> Find out more about this scandalous case of conflict of interest

2. They claim that because some other practices are worse (e.g. illegal fishing or driftnetting), then the disastrous practices of French vessels automatically become legitimate and acceptable. The implication is that we should leave them alone and devote our efforts solely to those practices they consider “worse”. This overlooks two issues: i) BLOOM is a French organization whose aim is to influence European fisheries management (we have no influence in Asia, for example, and do not seek to have any) and ii) Europeans are far from exemplary, so we feel that it is absolutely necessary to put our own house in order before taking to unevidenced-based preaching on the international stage.

We hereby respond to Orthongel’s press release, which makes a number of misleading assertions. This response is lengthy, not because we are seeking to justify ourselves — Orthongel’s arguments and our figures speak for themselves — but because we feel it is important to bring to everyone’s attention the elements described below, particularly at a time when many political decision-makers and journalists are no longer bothering to verify the information they peddle, repeating the misleading statements of industrial lobbies in their entirety.

For ease of reading, we have grouped these assertions into two main parts: the first seriously examines on Orthongel’s lies and allegations; the second focuses on more technical and generally insignificant points from which Orthongel is trying to divert attention given our uncompromising challenge to their deadly model.

ORTHONGEL’S LIES AND ALLEGATIONS

1.   BLOOM is the “Trojan horse” of the International pole-and-line foundation (IPNLF) and of the commercial interests of a certain John Burton.

According to Orthongel:

• BLOOM “works closely with the International Pole & Line Foundation (IPNLF), an NGO controlled by John Burton (a close friend of BLOOM founder Claire Nouvian) who is also the head of… World Wise Food (WWF), Europe’s market leader in pole-and-line tuna!”
• “BLOOM is acting like a Trojan horse for the IPNLF in John Burton’s trade war against European fisheries”
• “[BLOOM] prefers to deliver one-sided information to attack European fishing and defend the commercial interests of […] John Burton’s company“
• “By attacking European purse seiners on this very point [a customs agreement; see below], BLOOM hopes to influence in favor of the Maldives (and John Burton’s commercial interests) in the ongoing negotiations“
• “The timing of the release of this report responds to an agenda orchestrated and coordinated by John Burton as part of an opportunistic communications strategy“
• “BLOOM, from its Paris offices, is continuing its operation to destroy French and European fishing, in the service of foreign interests well established at the IOTC“

Why is this not true?

We did not have to wait to meet John Burton before taking an interest in European tuna fisheries and forming an opinion on its disastrous practices. Yes, we know the IPNLF and Mr. Burton:

• The IPNLF is an association representing pole-and-line tuna fishers from all over the world (the Maldives, Senegal, USA, Indonesia, Spain, Iceland, etc.), as well as major players in the retail sector (Migros, Marks & Spencer, Sainsbury’s, Woolworths, etc.). On its website, the IPNLF clearly defines itself as “born out of the need for representation of pole-and-line fishers in the Maldives”[3]
• John Burton is an English businessman whose company World Wise Foods trades in Maldivian and pole-caught tuna, as well as Italian tomatoes, French potatoes, American salmon and more.[4] As Orthongel points out, Mr. Burton was a founding member and president of the IPNLF, and his company is a member, but Orthongel’s insinuations about the omnipotence of this one man border on paranoia and/or the most far-fetched conspiracy theory. We will, of course, leave it to Mr. Burton to defend himself against the defamatory accusations levelled against him by Orthongel and relayed by the industry press.

We know these two players, just as we know many other stakeholders in the sector, from environmental NGOs, the industry and the government. That is what we do. We even know the trawl and tuna lobbyists, including those who write about such nonsense, but does that mean we “work closely” with them, or that we are “close“? Of course not. Claire Nouvian must have met John Burton four or five times at most since the creation of BLOOM in 2004; to claim that they are “close“, without any factual basis, is simply ridiculous. In any case, that is not the point…

We have been talking to John Burton and the IPNLF for years, both about tuna fishing in the Indian Ocean and about the controversial MSC label. We share certain points of view, notably on the importance of transforming the model of tuna fishing currently practiced by Europeans, i.e. a model that is unfair, highly subsidized and has a disproportionate impact on biodiversity and the climate, as we show in our report attacked by Orthongel. We talk to them in the same way as we talk to many other people representing economic interests, large and small (including Orthongel, at least in the past). This does not prevent us from disagreeing with them on certain points, or sharing a certain vision on others. BLOOM has always been happy to join forces with various commercial players, including fishers and the downstream industry, when our interests are aligned, as was the case, for example, during our campaigns against electric fishing or demersal seining.

But has BLOOM ever received a penny from John Burton or the IPNLF? No, we have not, nor have we received a penny from the fishing industry or supermarkets. We work in our own independent way, and if some of our studies do not support Mr. Burton or the IPNLF, that is obviously not a problem, and we will continue to discuss with these two stakeholders, much to the displeasure of French and Spanish industrialists, who obviously have little to criticize us for, given their stooping so low and beginning their tirade with this sort of nonsense.

Finally, what can we say about Orthongel’s assertion that “BLOOM, from its Paris offices, is continuing its operation to destroy French and European fishing, in the service of foreign interests well established at the IOTC“. We will skip the comment about the location of our offices… Which French fisheries is Orthongel talking about, exactly? France has three tuna fishing companies, and the least we can say is that none of them are really “French”:

• The Compagnie française du thon océanique (CFTO) was acquired in 2016 by Dutch giant Parlevliet & van des Plas.[5] One of its vessels is under Italian flag,[6] another under Belizean flag[7]
• Via Océan/Saupiquet has been owned by the Italian conglomerate Bolton Group since 1999. The company went into liquidation at the end of 2023 and its vessels are expected to be sold rapidly to foreign capital[8]
• Sapmer, part of the Bourbon Group, is the only company still owned by French capital, but has long been domiciled in Singapore. Since 2008, it has also had a presence in Mauritius with its Mer des Mascareignes processing plant, and has also flagged some of its vessels there (three until the end of 2023, when they were sold to foreign capital),[9] the others having been flagged in the Seychelles (also sold).

None of these vessels are based in France. They are all based in the most advanced tuna ports, as close as possible to the fishing grounds: in the Seychelles for the Indian Ocean. It is in these ports that these vessels drive the economy, as they buy supplies, refuel and unload their catches, which are then canned by the multinational Thai Union, owner of the Petit Navire brand, among others. Although the ships’ officers are French, the vast majority of sailors come from developing countries where labor is much cheaper, such as Madagascar or the Philippines.

Orthongel is trying to create the illusion of a “French fishery”, with the usual underlying threat to jobs, but nobody is being fooled. For a long time now, “French” tropical tuna fishing has no longer been “the” French fishery, but a large-scale industrial fishery in the hands of foreign multinationals, operating in a globalized economy and overusing the argument of jobs and the economy to protect its economic interests, whilst destroying the jobs of artisanal and subsistence fishing, the environment and public finances. The latest example, following the liquidation of the Sapmer and Via Océan fleets, is the CFTO’s announcement of a recovery plan, with a 30% cut in all salaries.[10]

2.   BLOOM is “complicit in illegal fishing in the Indian Ocean”

Having been outed as a sales representative for Maldivian pole-and-line fishing, we have now become accomplices in illegal fishing… but there are still no concrete facts from Orthongel to support this sensational revelation in the slightest. According to Orthongel:

• “BLOOM wants to focus attention on the EU purse seine fleet, but the main problem linked to the management of tuna stocks in the Indian Ocean is illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing”, whereas “European fisheries are among the most regulated in the world and have no reason to be ashamed of their practices”
• “BLOOM is thus complicit in [illegal] fishing in the Indian Ocean”
• “BLOOM’s complicit silence on “illegal” fishing not only plays into the hands of the Maldives and IPNLF, but also of the Chinese fleets whose practices in terms of forced labor and failure to respect fundamental human rights are denounced by the entire international community. There is no mention of these Chinese fisheries either in its latest report or in any of its other communications.”

Why is this not true?

In reality, European fisheries should clearly be “ashamed of their practices“. Studies demonstrating the negative impact of seine fishing associated with the extensive use of FADs on tuna stocks are numerous, and it has even been shown that the European fleet is considered to be the main contributor to the degraded state of tuna populations in the Indian Ocean.[11] The colossal impacts of the destructive fishing practices employed by European vessels have been pointed out since the very first meetings of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) in the late 1990s.[12] As early as 2002, Australia proposed banning FADs — used almost exclusively by Europeans — for part of the year, to allow ecosystems to recover.[13] Was John Burton already at work, twisting Australia’s arm to make life impossible for poor little European fishers?

It is worth remembering that this ‘FAD’ fishing method is associated with particularly high by-catches (including of vulnerable and endangered species) and juvenile tuna, thus reducing the reproductive potential of these species.[14] The deployment of several thousand FADs per year by Europeans — most of which are abandoned at sea and end up sinking to the bottom of the ocean or washing up on beaches or coral reefs — also generates a drastic source of plastic and electronic pollution. Scientists consider these drifting FADs to be “ecological traps”, as they disrupt the natural behavior of tuna and make them more vulnerable.[15]

> Find out more about the FADs used by Europeans in the Indian Ocean

The aim of our report is — obviously — not to draw up an exhaustive list of all the threats to tuna populations in the Indian Ocean. By diverting attention away from illegal fishing and claiming that “the main problem facing the management of tuna stocks in the Indian Ocean is illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing“, Orthongel is playing with a fallacy known as ‘deflection’, consisting in diverting attention from one problem (the impact of the European fleet and the use of their destructive FADs) by pointing the finger at another problem (illegal fishing and other high-impact tuna fisheries such as the use of drift gillnets, for example, used by Pakistani fishers), which Orthongel believes to be more serious.

By seeking to minimize the impact of FADs, Orthongel is turning a blind eye to its own practices and, in order to defend its interests, is adopting a position that runs completely counter to current scientific knowledge and the reality on the ground regarding the harmful impact of their drifting FADs (see below our other responses to Orthongel’s assertions).

Moreover, Orthongel’s reference to illegal fishing, going so far as to suggest that the problem lies with Maldivian pole-and-line boats due to a lack of on-board observers, is audacious, when European industrialists themselves have been found guilty of illegal fishing on numerous occasions. Let’s take the particular example of the Spanish company Albacora SA — one of whose shareholders and board member is none other than Javier Garat, Chair of Europêche, the lobby within which Orthongel has placed the maritime affairs administrator seconded by France, and who is under investigation by the Parquet national financier for illegal conflict of interest (see above) — is considered to be Europe’s biggest illegal fishing company.[16] Indeed, one of its tuna vessels, the Albacora Uno, was fined $5 million for illegal fishing inside the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between 2007 and 2009. In July 2012, the same vessel was intercepted by Marshall Islands authorities with the skin, fins and carcasses of 18 sharks on board, resulting in a $55,000 fine. In October 2013, the Albacora Uno was also fined one million euros for six incidents of illegal fishing in Nauru’s EEZ. The captain and fishing master pleaded guilty to this charge, but the settlement of the fine allowed the vessel to escape the Pacific Tuna Commission’s blacklisting procedures. Albacora SA’s vessels flying flags of convenience are not included in these numerous offences: five other Albacora SA vessels, for example, were caught fishing illegally in Liberian waters, for which they were fined $250,000. It would appear that illegal European fishing is not limited to this company, since in 2017, the vessel Alakrana, belonging to the Spanish company Echebastar, was also reported to have carried out illegal fishing operations in Maldivian waters.[17] To sum up, when it comes to illegal fishing, European tuna vessels are very, very far from beyond reproach.

Clearly, the fight against illegal fishing must be a collective priority, but these lawless practices can in no way be taken as any kind of benchmark for calibrating or evaluating the performance of authorized fishing activities, especially those that are European, subsidized and carried out outside Community waters, especially in view of the illegal practices to which they are accustomed! The European Union has a duty to set an example that Orthongel rejects head-on, completely ignoring the illegal practices of European companies that are members of the same lobbies/trade unions (such as Europêche). It is in order to support this necessary transition towards a more sustainable and equitable fishing model that BLOOM proposes this type of comparative report, which is in fact part of a complementary approach to that of other NGOs, such as the Environmental Justice Foundation, whose remarkable work on human rights violations and illegal fishing, particularly by Chinese companies (which, incidentally, are very much in the minority when it comes to tuna in the Indian Ocean),[18] is a major source of inspiration for our own work (for example, on the role of supermarkets and in the context of our legal action against Carrefour). This is also the case for journalist Ian Urbina’s “The Outlaw Ocean” project, dedicated entirely to the destructive practices of Chinese fisheries and the human rights violations they generate,[19] which we have widely relayed and used. Finally, we explicitly refer to the absolute need to reduce the impact of other high-impact fisheries, such as driftnets, in our official position paper published ahead of the IOTC annual meeting.[20] Orthongel’s claim that “There is no mention of these Chinese fisheries either in [BLOOM’s] latest report or in any of its other communications” is once again utterly dishonest.

By concluding its press release with the suggestion that the total ban on FADs called for by BLOOM “would also allow all other fisheries, which account for a majority of catches, to continue fishing without contributing to the effort, without improving their practices and without control. In short, it’s a lie to suggest that tuna stocks will improve by banning FADs and without tackling IUU fishing“, once again repeating unfounded accusations, contradicted by every word we say. Here again, one need only read our position paper submitted to the IOTC, for example, to read that “other urgent issues need to be addressed, such as ambitious stock recovery plans, a fair distribution of quotas, or mitigating the impact of other fleets that need to make a transition, such as gillnetting“.[21]

MORE TECHNICAL AND MARGINAL POINTS

1.   Scientific observation of fishing activities

According to Orthongel, “the scientific observation coverage rate on board pole-and-line vessels is less than 5%, whereas it is 100% on purse seiners, contrary to BLOOM’s assertions“. They continue: “As for the mandatory observation of all transshipments at sea at the IOTC, the Maldives obtained a derogation years ago for their vessels in their (immense) EEZ. There is therefore a total lack of control over these coastal vessels, mechanically encouraging IUU fishing which, as mentioned above, accounts for almost half of tuna catches in the Indian Ocean“.

Why is this not true?

Firstly, at no point in our report do we mention the rate of scientific observation coverage, nor do we assert anything on this subject. By using the phrase “contrary to BLOOM’s assertion“, Orthongel is invoking a fallacious argument for the sole purpose of making its case, in the hope that readers of their press release have not read BLOOM’s report.

Even if Orthongel is once again completely off the mark with this meaningless counter-argument, let’s return to their figures and insinuations.

“Scientific observation” is done in two ways:

• Thanks to the presence of physical observers, who are not sworn in and therefore have no role in monitoring activities or issuing reports in the event of infringements. In fact, the number of observers is higher on European purse seiners (27% for French vessels and 39.7% for Spanish vessels)[22] than on Maldivian pole-and-line vessels, simply because European vessels are much larger than Maldivian ones. European vessels have an average length of almost 89m, compared with 27m for Maldivian vessels. The duration of fishing trips is also very different: an average of 6 to 9 weeks for the Europeans, compared with a coastal, daily (or two-day) fishery for the Maldivians. It therefore goes without saying, except for Orthongel, that expectations in terms of taking on observers cannot be the same for the two fleets. But are European observers a guarantee of credibility? This is where Orthongel’s argument really comes into its own, since most of the observers on board Orthongel’s vessels are recruited, trained and paid by… Orthongel as part of its OCUP program.[23] So it is easy for Orthongel to claim that its vessels host observers, when in fact the latter are under contract to the fishing companies, with no independence whatsoever and thus subject to obvious conflicts of interest. In fact, it is very surprising that such a program exists, since the European legal framework requires observers to be “independent of the owner, the license holder, the master of the fishing vessel and any crew member” and to have “no economic link with the operator“.[24] This is thus yet another derogation for tuna fishing…
• Thanks to on-board cameras, it is possible to achieve 100% observation coverage, but this also poses a number of problems.[25] In particular, there is obviously a major limitation in terms of existing human capacity to analyze such video data streams. Nor is it at all obvious (or necessarily desirable) that this processing will one day be automated and delegated to artificial intelligence. So, for the time being, the value of video observation seems limited, even if we would obviously like to see such a video stream made available to civil society.

Moreover, Orthongel carefully avoids mentioning the lack of control (not observation) of its vessels: indeed, in June 2021, France was singled out by the European Commission for failing to control its external fleet (i.e. mainly tuna vessels). In a press release justifying this decision, the Commission stresses that “France has failed to ensure effective monitoring and control of the French external fleet and the enforcement of rules on the catch reporting, i.e. the so-called margin of tolerance of 10% per individual fish species and the submission of sales notes within 48 hours after first sale and of logbook and landing declaration“.[26] This infringement procedure is still ongoing.

It is also worth noting that the fishing statistics reported by Europeans, in particular the volumes caught by species and size class, are the result of a statistical ploy of which the actual scientific methodology is highly questionable. These statistics are almost certainly highly biased, as the Spanish industrialists themselves point out: “ The analysis identified potential sources of bias estimates of catch of tropical tunas may be subject to, of different magnitude depending on the ocean, fleet, and size category. The largest bias was recorded in the Indian Ocean. In the Atlantic Ocean the catches of yellowfin and bigeye tunas seem to be also underestimated, with underestimation of both large and small fish. Although the study is preliminary, the results obtained indicate that the system the EU is using to sample purse seine landings and estimate catches may be subject to bias which, if confirmed, could have consequences on the statistics, stock assessments, management advice, and management measures adopted by ICCAT and IOTC“.[27]

This data processing procedure, developed by the IOTC and ICCAT for the European fleet, is called “Tropical Tuna Processing” (T3). Due to the difficulty of accurately estimating the composition of species caught on board — so large are the volumes caught and the species sometimes similar — logbook statistics are “corrected” experimentally using data on tuna identified and measured randomly in certain ports. Data from this port sampling system are aggregated by quarter and geographical fishing area, for all fleets combined, which assumes that catches by EU and associated fleets in the same stratum (size category, fishing method, area, quarter) have exactly the same composition in terms of species and sizes. This is a staggering discrepancy! In the Indian Ocean, the statistical inconsistencies of the Spanish have been known for years, but the situation has still not been clarified.[28]

As far as Maldivian pole-and-line vessels are concerned, the data transmitted is considered to be of good quality and meet the reporting standards of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.[29] In particular, they have been used for many years as a basis for assessing skipjack stocks,[30] the species most heavily fished by Europeans. Is Orthongel calling these assessments into question too? Despite the lack of on-board observation of Maldivian pole-and-line vessels, there are other means of verifying the veracity of their catch declarations. In particular, landings data obtained through tuna export companies are used by the Maldivian Ministry of Fisheries to verify fishing logbooks and cases of non-reporting.[31] With the above-mentioned limitations to video observation, a World Bank-funded project to implement electronic monitoring is also underway. Electronic observation systems have been installed on 14 fishing vessels to achieve the required 5% coverage level for the fishing fleet.[32]

Furthermore, Orthongel suggests that the lack of observation on Maldivian vessels favors illegal fishing, which is at the very least petty, whilst also out of touch with reality (see above on the Europeans’ own illegal activities and their statistical tomfoolery). The Maldives, in particular, has introduced strict measures to prevent illegal fishing, especially for pole-and-line caught tuna. As far as we know, the derogation Orthongel refers to for transshipments at sea exists precisely because the conditions to prevent illegal activities are guaranteed, and this derogation was created within the framework of the IOTC.[33] In addition, each tuna export must be accompanied by a validation certificate and a catch certificate under European regulations on illegal fishing, to guarantee legality and traceability. The Maldives has also drawn up a national action plan to combat illegal fishing, which includes measures such as the introduction of satellite-based vessel monitoring systems (VMS) for the largest vessels, and strict documentation requirements for fishing activities.[34]

2.   The Maldives could soon benefit from a 0% customs agreement

According to Orthongel, “BLOOM berates the economic partnership agreement between the Seychelles […] and the EU, which provides for exemption from customs duties on products processed in the Seychelles and destined for the European canning market” but “knowingly forgets to point out that the Maldives, through John Burton, has also applied for exemption from customs duties on its tuna products to the EU!“.

Why is this not true?

BLOOM does not “berate” anything. Again, Orthongel’s claim that we represent the commercial interests of Mr. Burton (who is clearly a superman with almost unlimited powers, capable of forcing the hand of a sovereign state like the Maldives) is disingenuous and misleading. We have no particular interest in the Maldives benefiting from a customs agreement establishing 0% export taxes. Our report merely highlights an obvious and unjustifiable distortion of competition: the fact that tuna caught by European purse seiners using FADs benefits from tax exemption when processed in the Seychelles, Mauritius or Madagascar, while tuna caught by Maldivian pole-and-line vessels is taxed at 24%.

3.   The social conditions of Maldivian fishing are almost akin to slavery

According to Orthongel, “we have to forget the stereotypical image of the small coastal vessel. [Maldivian] boats can measure up to 35 meters in length, and the working conditions of the fishers are deplorable“. According to Orthongel, “some [fishers] have not been paid for several months. Why haven’t they been paid? Because the Maldives Industrial Fisheries Company (MIFCO), a state-owned company which buys their production from local fishers with large sums of public money, increased the purchase price of skipjack tuna between the two rounds of the last presidential election, in order to win back the fishers’ vote, without having the means to honor it… This electoral and artificial increase has had a disastrous effect on MIFCO and Maldivian fishers“.

Why is this not true?

Once again, Orthongel has loosely interpreted the contents of our report to make its case, hoping that no one has read our report. At no point in our report are the terms “artisanal” and “small-scale” used to describe Maldivian pole-and-line fishing. We simply describe it as “inshore and selective fishing“, which it is; “inshore” because fishing operations take place close to the atolls, exclusively in the Maldives EEZ; “selective” because the tuna is caught one by one. As indicated in our report, the vessels are up to 35m long (actually 37m), but this is a maximum value. As mentioned above, the average length of Maldivian pole-and-line boats is 27m,[35] compared with nearly 89m for European vessels (and up to 116m for the Albatun dos).[36] Maldivian pole-and-line vessels are “platform” vessels, which partly explains their length: most of the on-board technology is concentrated in the first few meters of the forward section of the vessel, the rest being a platform enabling many fishers to fish for tuna. Maldivian pole-and-line vessels are far from being small European purse seiners.

Orthongel also suggests that the social conditions of Maldivian pole-and-line fishers are “deplorable“. Some of them have allegedly not been paid for months, notably due to an untenable increase in the purchase price of tuna by MIFCO for electoral reasons between the two rounds of the presidential election. Orthongel obviously has more in-depth knowledge of this issue, and we do not deny that MIFCO, like many large companies, may not be beyond reproach. However, it is important to qualify this statement. According to official Maldivian government figures, pole-and-line fishers are extremely well paid compared to other national professions, with an average monthly income at least twice as high as the national per capita average of USD 1,500.[37] Fishing vessels in the Maldives use a catch-sharing system, which means that two-thirds of the profits generated by these fishing vessels are divided equally among the entire crew, with an additional share for the captain and bait master. Unlike seining, pole-and-line fishing generates a lot of local employment. Around 8% of the local population work in the Maldives’ primary fishing sector (mainly pole-and-line fishers), with around 40% of the total workforce aged between 18 and 24. Women are particularly involved in tuna processing activities. Fishing is therefore an essential source of income for many people, both directly and indirectly, supporting around 30,000 livelihoods.

In contrast to this predominantly responsible model across the pole-and-line tuna value chain, European tuna purse seiners employ almost thirty times as many sailors per ton of tuna caught, as we showed in our report. But that is not all. There are also glaring social inequalities between the officers — Europeans — and the deckhands, mainly from developing countries. In fact, fishers from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire recently went on strike for several days in June 2023, right in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean fishing season, to denounce top-low wages that would not even meet the minimum wage stipulated by the International Labor Organization (ILO), i.e. USD 658 per month.[38] Nor have French sailors been spared some highly critical social measures, as Compagnie française du thon océanique (CFTO; member of Orthongel), which has been in dire financial straits for years, announced a drastic turnaround plan including a 30% cut in employee wages.[39] A few months earlier, it was the turn of Via Océan (formerly Saupiquet; also an Orthongel member), a fishing company on the verge of liquidation, to threaten the jobs of some sixty employees.[40] Orthongel should start by putting its own house in order.

Finally, employment conditions in some canneries processing tuna caught by Europeans are also a cause for concern. Employees at the IOT cannery in the Seychelles — owned by Thai giant Thai Union, which also owns the Petit Navire brand — are mostly foreigners, which enables the company to keep wages down to around 450 USD (the minimum wage in the Seychelles). According to our sources, the workers, who are mainly Madagascan or Kenyan, live in a secure center on Perseverance Island, where measures are taken to limit their mobility and confine them to their place of residence, leaving almost exclusively to travel to work by bus. Activities and parties are organized inside the highly secure building, but employees seem reluctant to express themselves. They are mainly mothers who work at “deboning” fish to support their families back home.

4.   A large proportion of the Maldivian catch is unfit for consumption

According to Orthongel, “many pole-and-line vessels do not have the refrigeration facilities they need to preserve their catches optimally. They store the fish on deck before keeping it under ice on board. But at temperatures of 35°C, this method of preservation has its limits. As a result, a significant proportion of these catches (between 20% and 35%) are commercially non-conforming due to excessive histamine levels and are therefore continually rejected on the Bangkok market to be ultimately destroyed“. Orthongel points out that this represents “an enormous waste at landing, with a resource taken for nothing… The CEO of MIFCO was recently dismissed following, among other things, allegations of resale of these contaminated batches“.

Why is this not true?

As far as we know, Orthongel is referring here to a historical problem, which has largely been resolved by the Maldives. Indeed, the historical lack of refrigeration capacity may have led to problems of histamine contamination, but this problem has not existed for years, and tuna is now refrigerated quickly and correctly. The proof is in the European Union’s official health data, available via the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF): since 1 January 2020, the Maldives has only experienced two serious histamine-related alerts, compared to… seven for Spain, three for the Netherlands (whose one company owns the CFTO as well as processing plants) and two for France. Clearly, then, the Maldives have nothing to be ashamed of in terms of their performance when compared with the so-called exemplarity of European fishing. An audit of tuna exports from the Maldives between 2016 and 2021 revealed only 6% rejections in terms of export value, due to size grading problems or quality issues (including, but not limited to, histamine contamination).[41]

In this respect, we feel it is important to note that European tropical tuna fishing is also known to take serious risks when it comes to consumer health, notably by placing tuna reserved for the production of cans on the fresh tuna market, thus generating high risks of intoxication.[42] In 2021, a France 5 documentary shed light on this food and health scandal: like ham, for example, tuna preserved in brine, which is brown in color, was “spiked” with nitrites to revive its red color and rehydrate it, thus generating high risks of poisoning. Fraudsters would use so much nitrite that they would become violently itchy when handling it. In 2017, there were 450 cases of poisoning linked to tuna spiked with nitrites in Europe, and 80% of the sector supplying “fresh” tuna was affected by this fraud. Following these revelations, Europol mobilized the police forces of 11 different countries and seized over 130,000 tons of tuna. This is one of the biggest trafficking cases to date. In all, 79 criminals were arrested in Spain, France, Italy and Malta.

5.   Maldivian pole-and-line vessels have a major impact on fish used as bait

According to Orthongel, “in its demonstration of the sustainability of pole-and-line, BLOOM fails to mention a central point: the highly opaque issue of bait. Indeed, pole-and-line vessels need a lot of bait to catch tuna, and to date there is no scientific data to assess the impact of bait fisheries on stocks of small pelagic fish and on the coral reefs in which they are caught. In fact, scientists believe that bait fisheries should be counted as by-catch (estimated at 3.1% according to an older study published in Nature Policy, and at 7% in the MSC Public Certification Report)“. Orthongel adds that “this point will also be on the agenda of the IOTC meeting“.

Why is this not true?

This item was indeed put “on the agenda for the IOTC meeting“, and was dispatched very quickly, as it does not concern the IOTC. Unlike by-catches in the European tuna seine fishery, the bait fishery is a distinct component of the pole-and-line fishery and is currently considered from a fisheries management point of view as a fishery in its own right, subject to national law and not to concerted management within the framework of the IOTC (species not concerned, sedentary stock, etc.). However, Orthongel’s remark suggesting that these baits could be counted as “by-catch” is understandable. This is the one and only sensible point in their diatribe.

However, unlike seine fishing, bait fishing does not harm so-called “endangered, threatened and protected” (ETP) species such as sharks and turtles caught by European vessels. Furthermore, the species targeted have a very short reproduction cycle and are therefore less subject to overfishing problems.[43]

Finally, it is worth noting that the IPNLF has developed a pilot project aimed at eliminating the need for bait, in particular through the use of olfactory, visual or acoustic stimuli.[44] This project, partly funded by a grant from the British government, could put an end to European criticism.

6.   BLOOM is lying about European by-catches

According to Orthongel, “BLOOM suggests that purse seine by-catch can be as high as 13%. But this emphasised figure is in fact only the maximum value observed during a single trip. The choice of this figure is dishonest, given that the scientific consensus is around 5%, 85% of which are other tuna species, all of which are marketed for direct human consumption, according to the same study cited by BLOOM, which of course has a selective reading. The by-catch rate is precisely estimated at 4.7%“. Orthongel points out that “later in the BLOOM report, this figure is clearly indicated (in small type). But for the 95% of readers who read the introduction and then choose not to read the report, the damage is done!”

Why is this not true?

We need not even need to respond to this point, since Orthongel is so self-defeating. As Orthongel points out, and as is very clearly explained in our report, the figure of 13% is the maximum value observed for by-catches by European purse seiners under FADs: “Purse seining associated with the use of FADs by Europeans leads to high volumes of by-catches, which can reach 13% of the total volume of catches“.

Moreover, the average by-catch figures for European purse seiners and Maldivian pole-and-line fishers are clearly indicated, by ocean basin, only two pages later in the graphs summarizing the main results of the study. Contrary to Orthongel’s assertions, the figures are not “small“, and the proportion of by-catch that ends up back at sea is clearly indicated. There is therefore no manipulation of the information on our part, simply a synthesis.

Orthongel also claims that all by-catches are “marketed for direct human consumption“. However, there is no public data to confirm this claim, nor to trace the precise purpose of by-catches in the Indian Ocean. It is also astonishing to note that, despite the increase in observer coverage on board European purse seiners, no precise estimate of the by-catch rate and the proportion of this catch discarded overboard versus the proportion sold on local markets has recently been published. The latest study[45] estimating bycatch rates dates from 2018 and is based on observer data from the period 2008-2017, when observer coverage on board European tuna vessels was much lower (and largely prior to the OCUP program mentioned above). No study on the Indian Ocean details the purpose of these by-catches, which are said to be kept on board.[46] There are a few anecdotes concerning the use of some of the juvenile tuna or certain species such as marlin,[47] but to claim that everything brought on board is marketed without any loss is simply laughable. Moreover, even if this were the case, we might wonder about the negative effects of these by-catch sales on the local market and on fishing communities, who would then be subjected to an influx of low-priced, poor-quality fish from European industrial fishing.

7.    BLOOM is lying about the impact of European FADs and omits that of Maldivian ones

According to Orthongel, “BLOOM denounces the use of drifting FADs deployed by purse seine fleets as opposed to the anchored FADs used by the Maldives. It fails to mention that the IOTC has repeatedly pointed out the lack of reliable data provided by the Maldives on the exact number of anchored FADs… The drifting FADs used by European purse seiners are strictly controlled and registered“. He adds that “a resolution to limit their number and another to make them 100% biodegradable will be taken by the EU to the IOTC“. Orthongel commits a final big lie on the subject, claiming that “it should also be noted that the sources communicated on FADs in the BLOOM report are knowingly more than 10 years old. Why is this? Because this makes it possible to ignore the developments of recent years, in terms of reducing the number of FADs and the choice of materials: FADs have been non-meshing since 2012 and no longer entangle sharks or turtles“.

Why is this not true?

To claim that “drifting FADs used by European purse seiners are strictly controlled and registered” is daring, to say the least, since European manufacturers continue to fight fiercely to keep the geographical location and ownership of FADs as opaque as possible. A micro-advancement was achieved this year with the creation of a register, to which only official delegations from IOTC member states will have access… A far cry from the “strictly controlled and registered” FADs announced by Orthongel.

Furthermore, our figures are anything but “knowingly more than 10 years old“. In particular, the figure of 15,000 drifting FADs deployed each year by the Europeans corresponds to an average calculated over the period 2015-2021 from IOTC data.[48] If we look at the data for 2021 alone, the last year reported in this IOTC document, the number of FADs deployed officially stands at 4,281 for French purse seiners and 8,910 for Spanish purse seiners, giving a total of 13,191 FADs deployed in 2021 by the European purse seine fleet. The latest data published as part of the IOTC’s work are edifying: over the last four years, 100,000 new FADs have been activated in the Indian Ocean[49] (the vast majority of them European; Europeans catch around 95% of the catches made around FADs),  and the “half-life” (i.e. the time it takes for 50% to become inactive) of these FADs is only around 100 days.[50] In other words, each FAD is only used once, and very quickly ends up stranded on a coral reef or on the seabed, replaced by a new FAD for a new destructive fishing cycle.

Concerning the fact that FADs are now supposed to be non-mesh, this is clearly explained in the report, on p. 14: “repeated observations of the impact of FADs on shark populations have led the regional fisheries management organizations of the Atlantic Ocean (ICCAT) and Indian Ocean (IOTC) to make the use of so-called “non-mesh” FADs mandatory from 2016 and 2020, which no longer comprise nets but simply ropes and pieces of canvas.” However, despite this ban, a report dated from 2022 highlights that none of the drifting FADs recovered at random around the coasts of Kenya and Somalia complied with this obligation. An unknown number of gillnet FADs – some clearly identified as belonging to European companies – therefore continue to drift in the ocean. We therefore have serious doubts about the industry’s claims that it only uses non-entangling FADs, when none of the FADs found stranded are.

When they run aground, FADs destroy countless corals and can continue fishing for many weeks or even months (known as “ghost fishing”). A single FAD can damage up to 200m² of reef, as recently documented in the Mayotte Marine Park.[51] In the Aldabra atoll, a UNESCO World Heritage site, fishing nets and FADs are the main types of waste found around the island.[52] This collateral damage resulting from the use of drifting FADs is obviously not taken into account when calculating the by-catch of European tuna vessels.

Even in the case of 100% non-entangling FADs, the situation would hardly be better: the various parts of the FADs would continue to entangle in coral reefs, continuing to break coral structures through mechanical effects, and this would happen even if they were “biodegradable”. On this last point, Orthongel’s semantic deception should be noted, since they are indeed talking about partially biodegradable FADs, up to a maximum of 20% of the components. These are not sugars that dissolve in water after a few days…

Finally, Orthongel suggests that the exact number of FADs anchored in the Maldives is unknown, and therefore potentially underestimated, due to a lack of reliable data provided by the Maldives. In addition to being false, this argument is blatantly dishonest. Some 50 anchored FADs are managed by the Maldivian government, which maintains detailed records containing all information relating to the location, deployment and recovery of FADs when lost at sea. According to an IOTC report,[53] only 19 anchored FADs are lost each year before being replaced, making pole-and-line fishing one of the fisheries with the lowest abandoned gear footprint, with only 0.1 FADs lost for every 1,000 tons of fish caught. These figures are light years ahead of those for European FADs: it is estimated that at least 40% of drifting FADs deployed in the Indian Ocean are abandoned or lost at sea, which would correspond to several thousand FADs.[54] For the French company CFTO, for example, data shows that while some 2,750 FADs were deployed in 2021, only 34 were recovered at sea.[55] As these FADs are equipped with electronic beacons to track their drift and estimate the quantity of fish available beneath them, the loss and stranding of these beacons induce considerable electronic pollution (batteries, solar panels, electronic circuits, etc.), with impacts that are still largely unknown but undoubtedly negative.

8.   BLOOM is lying about juvenile catches

According to Orthongel, “BLOOM reports 61% juvenile catches for purse seiners versus 44% for pole-and-line vessels. These figures are based on catch declarations. In the absence of observers on board the pole-and-line vessels, there is no proof of their veracity, as they are based on uncontrolled fishing declarations… The IOTC Scientific Committee report, like the BLOOM report, shows that both fisheries catch the same sizes of skipjack. On the other hand, all yellowfin tuna caught by pole-and-line are juveniles, unlike seine fishing, which has a more balanced profile between juvenile and adult catches“.

Why is this not true?

Here again, Orthongel points to its own observers as a guarantee of quality, when in fact this is not the case. In the Maldives, the rate of juvenile catches by pole-and-line vessels has been estimated from data on the size frequencies of tuna caught, as well as from catch declarations which, as explained in point 3, are verified by means other than observers. The size frequency data come from the sampling program set up in the two main ports of landing for pole-and-line vessels. Although there is no systematic port sampling program, size samples of catches are regularly taken either by port samplers, shipboard samplers or by scientific observers from the Maldives Marine Research Institute (MMRI). Also, all licensed fish processing facilities are required to record and report size frequency data. The veracity of this data is therefore not in doubt.

Furthermore, as Orthongel points out, we clearly show in the report that the catch rate of juveniles by pole-and-line vessels is far from irreproachable, even if it remains lower than that of purse seiners. Pole-and-line vessels’ catches of bigeye and yellowfin tuna are almost entirely made up of juveniles, as are purse seine catches. However, as pole-and-line vessels mainly target skipjack, which has a lower proportion of juveniles, their catch rate of juveniles of all species is lower than that of purse seiners.

Finally, it should be remembered that one of the reasons why the European Commission has opened infringement proceedings against France under the control regulation is precisely because French declaratory data is of poor quality. By Orthongel’s own admission, French and Spanish fishers are unable to distinguish between juvenile yellowfin and bigeye tuna. Spanish data is just as questionable and have been criticized for years by the IOTC (see above).

> See our “The Tuna’s Black Box” report

This shows that our comparative analysis is factual, and we have no problem stating that pole fishing is not exempt from criticism. Our analyses are based on data and science alone, and it is astonishing to read Orthongel take offence at the fact that BLOOM would cherry-pick the figures presented, when the supposedly missing figures and facts are, in fact, very much there.

In fact, let’s not lose sight of the essential point: the operating model deliberately chosen by European tuna fishers. On the question of juvenile catches, French tuna fishers freely admit that their strategy of exclusive FAD fishing is based on the guarantee of catching juveniles of species that are currently overexploited (yellowfin tuna in particular), precisely to avoid reaching the quotas set for these species too quickly, since the individuals caught without FADs are overwhelmingly large, mature individuals! This is an excellent example of the spiral towards population collapse. A shipwreck driven by short-term and unacceptable economic logic; and let’s make no mistake: the Maldives, the IPNLF and John Burton are, alongside us, Orthongel’s only target because these stakeholders criticize the toxic and destructive model of European fishers.

9.   BLOOM is manipulating public opinion with a misleading narrative

According to Orthongel, “throughout its report, BLOOM stages an opposition between seine fishing and pole-and-line fishing. For example, the cover, which contrasts a seiner fishing (!) with pole-and-line anglers, is a misleading montage: seine boats have no access to Maldivian waters where pole-and-line anglers are active. This photo is therefore impossible! We can also safely assume that the smoke emanating from the seiner has been added…“. Orthongel goes on, pointing out that “by implying that European purse seiners dominate the world tuna fishery, BLOOM fails to point out that European purse seiners represent only a tiny fraction of the catches of the hundreds of Asian-owned deep-sea purse seiners, which rule the market with prices and standards well below those of the European fleet”. BLOOM fails to point out that “even in the Indian Ocean, artisanal fishing (or at least what it declares) accounts for more than half of catches. BLOOM thus polarizes the debate on “evil seiners” versus “good pole-and-line vessels” with a straightforward narrative, carefully avoiding the real issues, such as [illegal] fishing. This is a well-oiled communication strategy!”

Why is this not true ridiculous?

The aim of this report is to contrast European seine fishing with Maldivian pole-and-line fishing, in order to demonstrate that purse seine fishing is far from being the most sustainable model in terms of carbon footprint and impact on biodiversity, as tuna fishing lobbies claim. It is in this context that we have chosen to focus our comparison on pole-and-line fishing, which is often presented as one of the most responsible fishing models. Moreover, as we point out in the introduction to our report, these two fisheries are comparable in terms of fishing zone, volumes caught, target species and markets. It would have been unjustifiable, to say the least, to compare the European fishery with another fishery, either marginal, or targeting another species (e.g. bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean), or absent from the European market…

As for the cover of our report, it’s obviously an edited photo and not a real one, as is the case for all our report covers. Our readers will, of course, have understood this perfectly well. Does Orthongel also think that the cover of our report “Lining up the ducks” — in which we have depicted MEPs with a duck’s head — is a crude montage masquerading as a real photo?

Orthongel also criticizes us for writing that the “European Union is a major player in the world tuna fishery“, because European purse seiners’ catches supposedly represent only a “tiny” fraction of the total. In the Indian Ocean, tuna catches by purse seiners flying European flags (France and Spain) account for 20% of the total catch. But when vessels belonging to the same companies but flying a flag of convenience are included in the calculation[56] — which is more logical when assessing the overall influence of the European Union — this figure rises to 33% of total catches, and almost half of catches considered “industrial”.  The weight of Europeans is particularly strong in the Indian Ocean, but they are also present in other ocean basins. We estimate that European companies own 100% of the tuna seiners in El Salvador (6 vessels), 9% of the seiners in Ecuador (8 vessels), and 29% of the seiners in Panama (7 vessels), demonstrating the global hold of Europeans in tuna fishing. In conclusion, we have identified that 39 of the 50 largest purse seiners registered worldwide belong to European companies. Clearly, then, “the European Union is a major player in global tuna fishing“.

Finally, by shifting the problem to the Asian purse seine fleets, Orthongel is once again using a deception tactic, diverting attention from one problem (the impact of the European fleet) by pointing to another problem (the impact of the Asian fleets), which it claims is more serious.

10. BLOOM is lying about the carbon footprint of European ships

According to Orthongel, “the [BLOOM] report repeatedly refers to the low carbon footprint of purse seiners, insisting that this is a lie. BLOOM uses its own analysis to assess the carbon footprint of purse seiners and pole-and-line vessels, while mentioning ADEME’s AGRIBALYSE program. It is precisely on the basis of the results published by ADEME that Orthongel highlights a carbon footprint below the average of a number of artisanal and deep-sea fisheries, and well below the values obtained for salmon, chicken or beef production“. It concludes: “Once again, BLOOM’s comparison is limited to pole-and-line fishing“.

Why is this not true?

One begins to wonder whether Orthongel has actually read our report… We are not arguing that describing the carbon footprint of purse seiners as low is misleading. Rather, we indicate that it is far from optimal, contrary to the claims of the tuna fishing lobbies. The difference is subtle, but important. Indeed, the carbon footprint of purse seiners is better than that of terrestrial farmed animals such as beef (as clearly presented in Table 1 on p. 21) or even compared to other tuna fishing methods such as long-lining. However, it is far from the best, as our report shows.

Hence the interest in directly comparing the footprint of purse seiners with that of Maldivian pole-and-line vessels comes from a multi-criteria comparison which, to our knowledge, has not yet been carried out.

Seining is therefore not our only recourse in the face of climate collapse, an idea that manufacturers are trying to disseminate in the public arena through a narrative of “low-carbon” and supposedly “sustainable” fishing, even going so far as to argue that it is “good for the planet”.

Notes and references

[1] http://orthongel.fr/docs/presse/CPO-20240507-Bloom_fake_info.pdf.

[2] This article was written by Mr Erwan Seznec, whom we know well since, following an initial article published in 2023, we sued Le Point and Mr Seznec for defamation. In reality, this article was only picked up by a handful of poor-quality sector newspapers sympathetic to the cause of European tuna fishers, and not by “several other international media oulets” as Orthongel claims…

[3] https://ipnlf.org/about/.

[4] https://worldwisefoods.co.uk/products/.

[5] https://www.lesechos.fr/2016/05/le-numero-un-de-la-peche-au-thon-repris-par-un-neerlandais-229198.

[6] https://www.cfto.fr/pdf/compagnie/FR/cfto-navire-torre-giulia.pdf

[7] https://www.cfto.fr/pdf/compagnie/FR/cfto-navire-aven.pdf.

[8] https://lemarin.ouest-france.fr/peche/info-le-marin-la-compagnie-thoniere-via-ocean-ex-saupiquet-en-voie-detre-liquidee-b678bd7e-89de-11ee-a1c0-8cef14bedf93.

[9] https://www.clicanoo.re/article/economie/2023/11/09/la-sapmer-quitte-lile-maurice-sur-fond-de-tensions-654c3962d9a62.

[10] https://lemarin.ouest-france.fr/economie/entreprises/plan-de-redressement-a-la-cfto-les-marins-devront-faire-des-efforts-0e291c14-14ed-11ef-a1e9-6dc8255d0288.

[11] Correa et al. (2023) Responses of tuna stocks to temporal closures in the Indian Ocean.

[12] See, for example, the reports of the second, third and fourth sessions of the IOTC.

[13] IOTC (2002) Report of the Seventh Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.

[14] Tidd et al. (2023) Assessing the response of Indian Ocean yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) stock to variations in DFAD fishing effort.

[15] Jacquemet et al. (2011) Do drifting and anchored Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) similarly influence tuna feeding habits? A case study from the western Indian Ocean.

[16] Financial transparency coalition (2022). Fishy networks: Uncovering the companies and individuals behind illegal fishing globally

[17] Intrafish (2017) Tuna fishing group Echebastar refutes IUU claims.

[18] For example, see: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/Tide-of-Injustice-SWIO-report.pdf.

[19] https://www.theoutlawocean.com/ian-urbina/.

[20] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/05/IOTC-2024-S28-NGO19_-_Bloom_statement.pdf.

[21] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/05/IOTC-2024-S28-NGO19_-_Bloom_statement.pdf.

[22] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/04/IOTC-2024-CoC21-sCR05-EU_E.pdf.

[23] http://www.orthongel.fr/index.php?page=durabilite/cat/ocup.

[24] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2842/oj.

[25] IOTC (2021). Developing Electronic Monitoring System (EMS) standards to collect scientific data: learning from experience with French and associated fleets of the Indian Ocean

[26] European Commission (2021). June infringements package: key decisions

[27] ICCAT (2019). On the potential biases of scientific estimates of catches of tropical tunas of purse seiners the EU and other countries report to the ICCAT and IOTC

[28] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2023/12/IOTC-2023-WPTT25-RE.pdf.

[29] IOTC (2022). Report on IOTC data collection and statistics. See table 5 on p. 13.

[30] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/science/species_summaries/english/Skipjack%20tuna%20Supporting%20information.pdf.

[31] Government of the Republic of Maldives (2018) Maldives national report submitted to the Indian ocean tuna commission scientific committee. See p. 22.

[32] MSC (2023). Maldives pole & line skipjack tuna. Public certification report. See in particular p. 79 of the MSC certification report dealing with the quality of the data reported by the fishery.

[33] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/compliance/cmm/iotc_cmm_1806.pdf.

[34] UNEP (2019) Maldives National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (NPOA-IUU)

[35] According to the IOTC register of authorised vessels: https://rav.iotc.org/fe/record.

[36] Again, from the same register (https://rav.iotc.org/fe/record).

[37] FAO (2020). Securing sustainable small-scale fisheries Showcasing applied practices in value chains, post-harvest operations and trade. See p. 149 and p. 150 of this report.

[38] Mongabay (2023). Des pêcheurs ouest-africains en grève pour des salaires décents et « être respectés » sur des navires européens.

[39] Le marin (2024). Un plan de redressement drastique en discussion à la Compagnie française du thon océanique.

[40] Ouest France (2023). L’armement thonier Via océan, ex-Saupiquet, en passe d’être liquidé : 58 emplois menacés.

[41] https://audit.gov.mv/Uploads/AuditReports/2022/10October/75.Mifco_Fish_expoert_Report_FinalAuditReport.pdf (report in Divehi).

[42] https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2017/10/19/spanish-fishermen-processors-clash-over-whos-to-blame-for-brine-frozen-tuna-health-risks/.

[43] Jauharee et al. (2015). Livebait fishery review

[44] https://ipnlf.org/unlocking-a-huge-potential-for-ocean-conservation-and-climate-change-ipnlf-maldives-and-sntechs-innovation-seeks-to-limit-wild-caught-bait-fish-in-pole-and-line-tuna-fishing/.

[45] IOTC (2018). Bycatch of the european, and associated flag, purse-seine tuna fishery in the Indian ocean for the period 2008-2017.

[46] Amandè et al (2012). Precision in bycatch estimates: the case of tuna purse-seine fisheries in the Indian Ocean.

[47] http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/19678/Ocean+Basket+Seychelles+to+build+large+fish+processing+company+despite+delays.

[48] IOTC (2022). Review of data on drifting fish aggregating devices. See tables 1 and 2 on page 20.

[49] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/06/IOTC-2024-WGFAD06-05_-_Data_0.pdf.

[50] https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/06/IOTC_meeting_Jun2024_slides.pdf.

[51] Marine Natural Park of Mayotte (2023) Échouage d’un dispositif de concentration de poissons (DCP) dérivant issu d’un thonier senneur.

[52] Burt et al. (2020) The costs of removing the unsanctioned import of marine plastic litter to small island states.

[53] IOTC (2019). Use of anchored FADs in the Maldives – Notes for a case study for assessing ALDFG.

[54] Imzilen et al. (2022) Recovery at sea of abandoned, lost or discarded drifting fish aggregating devices.

[55]  MSC (2023) CFTO Indian Ocean purse seine skipjack fishery – 1^st Surveillance audit report.

[56] All the large seiners listed in 2022 in the Seychelles, Mauritius, Oman and Tanzania were European-owned.